"Support for Saddam, including within his military organization, will collapse after the first whiff of gunpowder."
-- Richard Perle, then-Pentagon Defense Policy Board chairman, July 11
A little good news
Before we dive into the latest round of finger-pointing, let’s enjoy a piece of good news. The Washington Post details how one Marine unit is trying to build bridges to Iraqi civilians – and is getting some promising responses.
Now, about our war plan …
We just don’t have enough troops on the ground in Iraq to wrap up this conflict quickly. So how did that happen?
Some of the trouble appears to have begun last summer at elaborate war games that were two years in the making, cost $250 million to stage and were fought in a fictional country resembling Iraq. The respected former Marine general who headed the "Red," or opposition force says the exercises were rigged to guarantee that U.S. forces won.
This is particularly disturbing because the purpose of the games was to test the radical new concepts we are now employing in Iraq.
These complaints are not being lodged with the benefit of hindsight. The "Red" general, Paul Van Riper, got so frustrated he quit halfway through the exercises.
High-ranking officers who helped plan the games and who participated in them said they were "free play" in which either side could win.
Van Riper disagreed: "They had a predetermined end, and they scripted the exercise to that end."
All of which could help explain Lt. Gen. William Wallace's observation last week that, "The enemy we're fighting is different from the one we'd war-gamed against ..."
Fred Kaplan at Slate has a fine exposition, with numerous other links.
Then there’s the recurring question of whether Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld cut in half the forces that top commanders wanted assigned to the invasion. Runsfeld denies that, as do the top-level Pentagon brass and the theater commander, Gen. Tommy Franks. Other present and former military officers, including retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who commanded the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division in the Gulf war, say troop requests were cut and that Rumsfeld "micromanaged" the war buildup.
The top leadership from Rumfeld on down insists that the plan was sound and as executed is going according to schedule. The New York Times (free registration required) sums up their positions.
Peter Arnett, probably the best-known correspondent of the Gulf War and a Pulitzer Prize winner in 1966 for his Vietnam coverage, has never shied from controversy. He told Iraqi TV in an interview that the U.S. war plan had failed because of Iraqi resistance and that the Pentagon was trying to write a new one.
Arnett drew government fire in ther 1991 Gulf War for staying in Baghdad and reporting what was going on there. It looks like we're in for a repeat.
The Los Angeles Times suggests time may be the real enemy of the U.S. because the longer the war continues the heavier the fallout will be.
Muslim rage intensifies
In the Muslim world, TV coverage of the civilian victims of the war, of which Americans see only the most fleeting glimpses, has raised outrage to new and unprecedented levels.
Basra is still a tough nut
Basra, the second-largest city in Iraq, hasn't fallen despite a week-long siege by British troops. Nothing suggests this will change soon, despite incursions by the British and bombing by the U.S. And this was where the repressed Shiites were supposed to throw flowers in front of our tanks, as if this were Paris in War II.
Saddam’s irregulars
During the sandstorm that slowed U.S. troops down outside Baghdad last week, there were reports that a huge Republican Guard column was moving toward U.S. positions. Later, it was downplayed as "troops in SUVs."
In retrospect, it seems likely that these were Fedayeen Saddam or other irregular forces that have been harassing our supply lines. And their mode of transport dovetails nicely with an item in DEBKAfile, which says Saddam’s son Udai, who commands the Fedayeen, ordered 7,500 four-wheel-drive pickups, which were then mounted with heavy machine guns.
More disturbingly, DEBKA claims Udai* Hussein has spent the last year bulking up Iraq’s irregular forces to a staggering 800,000. If these numbers even approach reality, the administration’s suggestion of "difficult days ahead" will prove a major understatement.
Details of all this are in DEBKA's War Diary below the headlines.
*Note: Udai’s name also is spelled Odai (the form used in The Seattle Times). I use the form of the sites I link to in order to avoid further confusion in an already confusing picture.
Is our strategy unworkable?
Shekar Gupta, writing in the Indian Express, tackles the U.S. and British military’s modern approach to war.
"One look at an allied soldier and you’d suspect the war is not so much about fighting and winning as about marching into Baghdad without paying any price for it," he says.
What’s wrong with that? Gupta argues that it seeks to eliminate direct contact with enemy troops, without which no major conflict can be won.
Adapting and moving ahead
Mac Owens at the National Review Online argues calmly that U.S. commanders are adapting to changing circumstances and moving ahead.
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