The state Supreme Court just released its decision upholding the state law that says felons must pay all fines and court fees before having their voting rights restored. The majority opinion was written by Justice Mary Fairhurst:

We hold that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme does not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. We also hold that respondents lack standing to bring their cross-appeal, and we deny respondents' request for attorney fees because they are not the prevailing party. We reverse the trial court.

MORE: There are five opinions in the case and I'm still making my way through them. The majority opinion was signed by Fairhurst, Susan Owens and Bobbe J. Bridge.

The case comes from three convicted felons who were trying to get their voting rights restored. But state law says they have to complete all the terms of their sentences, including what's called legal financial obligations, before being able to vote. The plaintiffs argued that violated their state and federal constitutional rights because it denies them the right to vote based on wealth.

The majority wrote:

The privileges and immunities clause does reflect, in part, our framers' concerns with "undue political influence exercised by those with large concentrations of wealth" and "avoiding favoritism toward the wealthy." Grant County II, 150 Wn.2d at 808. However, such concerns are not triggered by Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme because it grants the "privilege" of restoration of voting rights "upon the same terms . . . equally . . . to all citizens." Const. art. I, § 12. The Washington Constitution grants the right to vote to all Washington citizens on equal terms. Additionally, the Washington Constitution disqualifies voters on equal terms -- that is, when individuals have been convicted of committing a felony. Finally, Washington's statutory disenfranchisement scheme provides for the restoration of voting rights to felons on equal terms -- that is, only after individuals have satisfied all of the terms of their sentences.

...

We hold that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme does not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution or the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. It is the province of the legislature to determine the best policy approach for re-enfranchising Washington's felons.

Here's the majority opinion, a concurrence by Barbara Madsen, a concurrence by James Johnson, a dissent by Chief Justice Gerry Alexander, and a dissent by Tom Chambers.

Alexander's dissent, which was signed by Chambers and Charles Johnson, says the Legislature has already set a policy of trying to get convicted felons to return to the rights of full citizenship.

As a society, we should encourage, rather than discourage, felons to rehabilitate themselves. As members of this society, we all benefit when those who have failed in the past to fully live up to their responsibilities as a citizen become full-fledged citizens who again can exercise the cherished right to vote. We should all rejoice when they achieve that goal. Indeed, the legislature has indicated that it is the policy of this state "to encourage and contribute to the rehabilitation of felons and to assist them in the assumption of the responsibilities of citizenship." RCW 9.96A.010. Having set this laudable goal for felons, we should not prevent them from achieving it simply because they lack ability to pay legal financial obligations (LFOs).

More from Alexander:

The injustice this works is obvious. As respondents point out, "If the state
sentencing guidelines said that judges should sentence wealthy felons to five years incarceration followed by immediate restoration of rights and sentence poor felons to five years incarceration followed by lifetime disenfranchisement, the equal protection problem would be apparent."

Madsen has several disagreements with the case law cited by the majority. She also wrote that she disagrees with Alexander's "unwarranted emphasis on wealth."

The State does not, contrary to the dissent's view, create inequities between the rich and the poor by tying voting to the ability to pay. The plaintiffs were convicted of felony crimes and for this reason were disenfranchised; this is why they cannot vote. Regardless of whether they are rich or poor they will continue to be disenfranchised until they complete their sentences, including their legal financial obligations. They have no constitutionally protected right to vote. The legislature can change the requirements for reinstating a felon's right to vote if it concludes that requiring felons to pay all financial obligations before regaining the vote is too harsh a condition to place on such a precious attribute of citizenship, but it is not constitutionally required to do so.

SOME BACKGROUND: The case stems from a 2004 lawsuit.

The case was filed on behalf of five convicted felons who served their sentences, completed their community supervision and have begun paying off their fines and fees. In 2002, the Department of Correction estimated there were 46,500 Washingtonians who were prohibited from voting based solely on outstanding financial obligations, according to the lawsuit.

One of the plaintiffs, Daniel Madison of Seattle, was convicted in 1996 of third-degree assault. He was sentenced to probation and required to pay $583 in restitution and fees. He is disabled and indigent, and said he is on a payment plan of $15 a month. So far, he has paid $260, but, because the court has assessed interest, he doesn't foresee catching up.

In March 2006, a King County Superior Court judge ruled the law unconstitutional.

"It is well recognized that there is simply no rational relationship between the ability to pay and the exercise of constitutional rights," Judge Michael Spearman wrote in a ruling backing the challenge of three indigent felons.

... He said "discrimination on the basis of wealth and property has long been disfavored."

State Attorney General Rob McKenna and Secretary of State Sam Reed announced soon after they would appeal the decision.

"We believe a rational basis does exist for the Legislature to deny felons the right to vote until they have completed their entire court-ordered sentences, including payment of criminal penalties, victim's restitution, and legal fees, rather than separating out various sentencing aspects," they wrote.

The Supreme Court heard arguments in June 2006.

Arguing for the American Civil Liberties Union, attorney Peter Danelo told justices that the group doesn't disagree with Washington's right to disenfranchise convicted felons, or the requirement that they pay court-ordered fines. But the right to vote should not be tied to those fines, he said.

"What this case is about is whether the state, once it decides to restore the vote to former felons, can make the right to vote turn on whether particular felons are wealthy enough to pay financial obligations immediately," he said.