James Baker said — in what I think may be an unfortunate metaphor — that there is no "magic bullet" to solving the Iraq crisis. But he does think that every one of his Iraq Study Group's 79 recommendations needs to be implemented to make the plan work.

That's what he said this morning in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee:

Bipartisanship is critical. This is an extraordinarily difficult problem. And unless the country comes together behind a unified approach, we're going to have a tough time dealing with it.

Secondly, I hope we don't treat this like a fruit salad and say, "I like this, but I don't like that" — "I like this, but I don't like that."

This is a comprehensive strategy designed to deal with this problem we're facing in Iraq, but also designed to deal with other problems that we face in the region and to restore America's standing and credibility in that part of the world.

So that's why we say in here it's important, these are interdependent recommendations we make. And we hope that, when people look at them and start thinking about implementing them, they'll think about implementing all of them and, certainly, at least as many as they can.

The package deal will come as a surprise to the congressman who first pushed for an independent commission for "fresh eyes on Iraq." Rep. Frank Wolf, R-Va., first called for a commission in September 2005 after a trip to Iraq.

On Washington Post radio this morning, Wolf said he thought the Baker group did "a very good job in a very realistic way." But in the interview done about an hour before Baker and Hamilton appeared in the Senate, he clearly did not expect to hear that the recommendations needed to be adopted in whole.

"They have not said, 'It's my way or the highway.' These are recommendations."

Wolf said he looks at the Baker commission as getting a second medical opinion.

"You would want to get the best opinions from everybody and then you meld them together and do what's in the best interest of you, and so we would hope that would be done by the administration in the best interest of the country."

In looking back at Wolf's original idea for the group, it seems the final report goes a step or two further than he envisioned. In a Washington Post op-ed in 2005, Wolf made it sound almost like he hoped the report would be used to bolster the Bush Iraq strategy.

The Bush administration needs to face the reality that a growing number of Americans are becoming skeptical of our efforts, partly because they do not have the benefit of seeing the entire picture. No one I talked to during my recent trip believes we will lose the war on the ground in Iraq; it's here at home that they are concerned about. One general told me point-blank that the "center of gravity" for our success in Iraq is the American public.

For the United States to stay the course in Iraq the public needs to fully appreciate the progress that has been made, be able to trust that those directing the war have made an honest assessment of what has gone right and what has gone wrong, and understand the potentially cataclysmic consequences of walking away from Iraq before the job is done.

Wolf spokesman Dan Scandling told me this afternoon that his boss is pleased with the work done by Baker. But he said Wolf sees it as part of a "continuing dialogue" and "a piece of a number of reviews being done."

This morning though, Baker and his co-chairman Lee Hamilton seemed almost touchy on the subject of anyone putting their own stamp on the recommendations.

Committee Chairman John Warner said Bush will have to look at the report as well as consider National Security Council input and an upcoming report from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Warner: And then he's got to synthesize this, make these decisions.

...

Hamilton: I do have some question about your word "synthesize." I think it's terribly important that we understand that you cannot solve the Iraqi problem in pieces. And so you have to approach it comprehensively.

If you think you can solve the problem of Iraq by manipulating the troop levels, I think you got it dead wrong. If you think you can solve the problem by economic reconstruction or political action, I think that's wrong, too.

What has to be done is that all of the tools of American power have to be integrated carefully here — political, economic, military, for sure — and to use those effectively.

In an April letter to Congress outlining what it hoped to accomplish, the commission did not spell out that it would make specific recommendations, or suggest that the report would be offered as something that needed to be adopted in its entirety to achieve success in Iraq:

We will assess the current situation in Iraq, and seek to develop insights and advice that might be of interest to the administration and Congress, and thereby beneficial to the country.

It was delivered today as much more of a manifesto.